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The fall...
 Dickinson, Shanks, & 
Evenden (1984)
 Waldmann & Holyoak
(1992):
 The results presented in this article 
clearly refute connectionist learning 
theories that subscribe to an 
associationistic representation of 
The rise...
events as cues and responses (p. 233)
 Mitchell, De Houwer, & 
Lovibond (2009):
 Overall, therefore, we see no reason 
to postulate the existence of a link-
formation system in addition to a 
propositional reasoning system (p. 
194)
BUT conditions seem to apply...
 An analysis of the conditions under which inferential or 
associative processes control performance may be a 
more fruitful approach (e.g., Shanks, 2010)
 How do these processes operate?
 Associative-activational processes are fast whereas inferential 
processes are slow: 
 The former invoke the transmission of activation or inhibition between 
representations, and the latter assume some calculus for combining and 
manipulating semantically interpretable symbols to yield rational 
inferences (Shanks, 2007, p.304)
 Speeded tasks may favour an associative-activational
control of performance
BUT conditions seem to apply...
 An analysis of the conditions under which inferential or 
associative processes control performance may be a 
more fruitful approach (e.g., Shanks, 2007)
 How do these processes operate?
 A verbal instruction can update knowledge if represented in a 
propositional format BUT cannot update the associative strength 
of a cue (see e.g., De Houwer, 2009 or Lovibond, 2003). Only 
trial-by-trial learning may update the associative strength of a 
cue
 Knowledge update by a verbal instruction may signal the 
operation of inferential processes
And rise again...?
 Morís, Cobos, Luque, & López (2014; Experiment 4) 
showed that a verbal instruction affected 
performance in a contingency judgment task 
(unspeeded task) but it could not affect performance 
in an associative repetition priming task (speeded)
And rise again...?
 BUT... again, there are conditions in which verbal 
instructions may control performance even in speeded
contingency learning tasks (e.g., IAT, De Houwer & 
Vandorpe, 2010)
 THUS... maybe associative-activational processes 
play no role in contingency learning
 Easy solutions are not always good solutions!
Experiment 1
 Will a verbal instruction influence performance 
depending on the time pressure, under the same test 
conditions of a contingency task?
 Should the fast task facilitate an associative-
activational control of performance, the verbal 
instruction will not produce much knowledge update.
 The verbal instruction will produce significant
knowledge update in the slow task as inferential
processes will control performance
Cued-response task
+
 : mandatory stimulus that 
prompted a response, as quick as 
possible, for each of the two possible 
locations (left/right)
500 ms
Correct!
SOA
500 ms
 Short SOA 
(speeded): 250ms.
 Long SOA 
(unspeeded): 
1000ms.
(adjustable moving
temporal window)
Experiment 1
Partial reversal
Informed
36 x
A→ 2
No change B→ 1
Uninformed C→ 1
No change D→ 2 
SOA Learning
Short (speeded)
(250 ms)
72 x
A→ 1
B→ 1
Long (unspeeded)
(1000 ms)
C→ 2
D→ 2
Verbal instruction
“A goes now with 2” 7
 Short SOA: According to an associative-activational
control of performance, the verbal instruction will 
not be able to update the knowledge acquired:
 Performance during Partial reversal should 
reflect the associative strength of the cues, as 
acquired during the Learning phase.
Experiment 1
Partial reversal
Informed
36 x
A→ 2
No change B→ 1
Uninformed C→ 1
No change D→ 2 
SOA Learning
Short (speeded)
(250 ms)
72 x
A→ 1
B→ 1
Long (unspeeded)
(1000 ms)
C→ 2
D→ 2
Verbal instruction
“A goes now with 2” 7
 Long SOA: According to an inferential control of 
performance, the verbal instruction will be able to 
update the knowledge acquired:
 Performance during Partial reversal should 
reflect to a lesser extent the knowledge 
acquired during the Learning phase.
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Cue x SOA: F(2,166)=5.686; p.=.004
 Informed=No change
 Long SOA:
 No change=Uninformed
 Informed<No change/ 
Uninformed
Discussion
 Both, associative-activational and inferential 
processes appeared to control performance: 
 RTs reflected to a greater extent the knowledge 
acquired during the Learning phase in the Short SOA 
group than in the Long SOA group (i.e., less knowledge 
update in the Short than in the Long SOA group)
 BUT... even in the Short SOA group, performance 
was sensitive to a verbal instruction: 
 Informed=No change
Discussion
 Will this sensitive performance to a verbal 
instruction be reflecting a genuine knowledge 
update of what was learnt during the Learning
phase?
 If so, the knowledge acquired during the previous 
Learning phase would have a unique propositional 
format AND THUS, no need to postulate an 
associative-activational process
Experiment 2
 Does this sensitive performance to a verbal 
instruction mean genuine knowledge update or, 
alternatively, fast responses to a verbal instruction 
that is active in working memory as shown in e.g., 
speeded Go-No go and Stop-signal tasks? 
Experiment 2
 Using the same cued-response task:
Partial reversal
Inform. 1
2 x
A→ 2
No-chg. B→ 1
SOA Learning
Short
(250 ms)
A→ 1
B→ 1
Long C→ 2
Instr. 1
“A 
goes 
now 
Instr. 2
“C 
goes 
now 
Partial reversal (Cont.)
Inform. 1
34 x
A→ 2
No-chg. B→ 1
Inform. 2 C→ 1
5
 If Instr. 1 produces a genuine knowledge update, RTs
to Inform. 1=No-chg. during Partial reversal (Cont.)
 Alternatively, Instr. 1should have been replaced in 
working memory by Instr. 2 and thus, RTs to Inform. 
1>No-chg.
No-chg. D→ 2 
(1000 ms) D→ 2
with 2” with 1”
No chg. D→ 2 
Results
 Short SOA  Long SOA
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Cue x SOA x Trial: F(8,143)=2.789; p.=.007
 Inform. 1>No-chg.
 Inform. 2<No-chg.
 Inform. 1=No-chg.
 Inform. 2<No-chg.
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Discussion
 No genuine knowledge update seems to have
occured in the Short SOA group:
 Only in the Long SOA group the first verbal instruction
had a durable effect: Inform. 1 cue= No Chg. cue
 In the Short SOA group Inform. 1cue >No Chg. cue
 Not surprisingly, RTs to Inform. 2 in both SOA 
conditions (while the verbal instruction was active in 
working memory) produced short RTs
Conclusion
 Associative-activational and inferential processes 
appeared to have controlled performance: 
 Experiment 1. SOA had a different impact on the 
control of performance produced by verbal instructions, 
suggesting different representational formats
 Experiment 2 served to show that low RTs to Informed 
cues in the Short SOA group of Experiment 1 did not 
reflect a genuine knowledge update produced by a 
verbal instruction but its activation in working memory
Conclusion
 Our data remain silent about how the knowledge 
acquired during the initial Learning phase has taken 
place (whether associatively or by means of 
inferential processes)
 In any case, and importantly, such knowledge was 
retrieved during the Partial reversal phase by means 
of associative-activation processes in the speeded 
task
 Thus, the dismissal of these processes in contingency 
learning tasks may be regarded as premature: 
probably, a too easy solution
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